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The Solomon Islands government is 
considering introducing laws aimed at 
strengthening political parties, restricting 
members of parliament (MPs) from switching 
sides and halting excessive use of ‘no-
confidence’ motions. The government wants 
to: 1) abolish the constitutional position 
of the ‘Leader of the Independents’;2 2) 
reform the process of the selection of prime 
ministers; and 3) build a more coherent 
party system by adopting legislation similar 
to that experimented with in Papua New 
Guinea.3 The aim is to increase political 
stability and give prime ministers and 
cabinets an opportunity to implement their 
policies without having to focus continually 
on sustaining fragile coalitions, or on 
attracting opposition members to cross the 
floor to strengthen governments.
Objectives of party integrity 
legislation
Such laws, sometimes referred to as 
political party integrity legislation, can 
serve several objectives. Sometimes, the 
aim is parliamentary stability, sometimes 
nation-building and sometimes the goal 
of strengthening parties is driven by the 
view that strong political parties are an 
inevitable feature of ‘proper’ democracy 
(although ancient Greece, the ‘cradle of 
democracy’, never had political parties and 
nor for that matter do many local councils 
in the mass democracies of Western Europe 
or Australasia).4 Legislation against floor-
crossing has been introduced in many parts 
of the Pacific, including in Fiji, New Zealand 
and Papua New Guinea. The Samoans have 
legal controls on what kinds of new parties 
can be formed (So’o and Fraenkel 2005:355). 
Even in Tahiti (French Polynesia), frustration 
with frequent government changes led 
Gaston Flosse to alter the electoral law in 
2004, hoping to stabilise the political order 
(although the result was a major defeat for 
his party). Often, the true objective behind 
party integrity legislation is to strengthen 
governments, despite the public rationale 
being to strengthen political parties.
In several cases, laws against MPs 
crossing the floor have been introduced 
in the hope of consolidating one political 
faction, but have ended up strengthening 
another. That is what happened in Papua 
New Guinea and Fiji. In Papua New 
Guinea, the government of Sir Mekere 
Morauta introduced laws binding MPs to 
political parties, but Sir Michael Somare 
won the 2002 election and his government 
proved to be the beneficiary of the new 
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laws. The opposition in Papua New Guinea 
stayed away from parliament during 
much of the second half of 2004, frustrated 
by its inability to challenge the Somare 
government. In the wake of the 2007 
election, leading figures on the opposition 
benches—including New Ireland Governor, 
Sir Julius Chan—denounced the Organic 
Law on the Integrity of Political Parties 
and Candidates (OLIPPAC) legislation as 
promoting dictatorship (‘Dump law: Chan’, 
The National, 15 August 2008).
In Fiji, Sitiveni Rabuka’s government 
amended the constitution to prevent floor 
crossing in 1997, but Mahendra Chaudhry 
won the 1999 election. The new law ensured 
that Chaudhry’s Fiji Labour Party’s 37 seats 
in the 71-member parliament formed an 
unbreakable majority. The allied parties in 
the Labour-led People’s Coalition all split, 
with the rank and file joining opposition 
protests against the government. Within 
Labour ranks, Fijian members such as Dr 
Tupeni Baba and Kenneth Zinck challenged 
the policies being pursued by the Labour 
leader. These rebels could not, however, 
legally switch sides. A year later, Fiji 
witnessed a coup d état.
In other cases, laws binding MPs to 
political parties have not worked as intended. 
In India, more MPs crossed the floor after 
1985 legislation aimed at preventing floor 
crossing than beforehand (Indian Advisory 
Panel on Electoral Reforms, 2001:24). In 
New Zealand, laws against MPs switching 
sides simply delayed inevitable political 
realignments and political opinion turned 
against their continued use (Geddis 2002). 
Likewise in Papua New Guinea, when 
Treasurer Bart Philemon fell out with his 
Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare, the 
new laws prevented him from founding 
the inevitable new political party (the New 
Generation Party) until shortly before the 
2007 polls. One 2003 survey of the use of 
rules against party defections concluded 
that, leaving aside a few as yet untested 
exceptions, the legislation was ‘problematic 
at best and unworkable at worst’ (Miskin 
2003:iii).
In Papua New Guinea, the rules against 
floor crossing contained in the OLIPPAC 
have not yet been fully tested before the 
courts. Eleven members broke ranks during 
Somare’s 2002–07 government, but none lost 
their seat. What will happen in Papua New 
Guinea when a prime minister finds himself 
politically isolated and unpopular? What 
will happen if only the law prevents the fall 
of such a government? There are plenty 
of cases across the Pacific where prime 
ministers have shown themselves willing 
to exploit every available legal instrument 
to avoid the fall of their governments 
(consider, for example, then Solomon 
Islands Prime Minister Francis Billy Hilly’s 
attempt to rescue his government in 1994 
or Manassah Sogavare’s efforts to stave 
off impending defeat in late 2007). If laws 
are in place protecting prime ministers 
against no-confidence votes, will they be 
complied with when they are used in such 
a transparently self-serving manner? The 
former PNG Chief Justice has suggested 
that, in such circumstances, the OLIPPAC 
could not withstand a constitutional 
challenge. The courts may rule the law null 
and void because it restrains MPs’ freedom 
of association or conscience (Personal 
communication, Sir Arnold Amet, former 
Chief Justice of Papua New Guinea, Honiara, 
April 2006). In Vanuatu, then Prime Minister 
Serge Vohor passed laws in 2004 providing 
a 12-month ‘grace period’ during which 
there could not be a no-confidence motion; 
this was, however, ruled unconstitutional by 
the courts and the Vohor government was 
subsequently toppled.5
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Essentials of the OLIPPAC
How does the OLIPPAC work in Papua 
New Guinea? First, under the OLIPPAC, the 
party with the largest number of seats after 
an election receives the initial invitation to 
form a government (see Gelu 2005). The law 
helped Sir Michael Somare to become Prime 
Minister in 2002 and again for a second 
time after the July 2007 elections for he was 
after both elections the leader of the largest 
party (The National Alliance). Second, there 
are some rather weak financial incentives 
to join parties (and added incentives for 
female candidates), disincentives to remain 
as independents and rules regarding the 
registration of political parties. Third, 
and most importantly, MPs in Papua 
New Guinea who vote for a particular 
prime minister cannot vote against that 
prime minister in any vote of confidence, 
budgetary vote or vote on constitutional 
amendments for the life of the parliament. 
There are loopholes. If a party decides 
collectively to switch sides—in accordance 
with its internal rules and procedures—it 
can do so. For that reason, many PNG 
politicians constituted themselves as one-
man political parties to retain their freedom 
to switch. Others nominally conformed to 
the law, if only to reduce the prospect of 
judicial intervention. Such responses to 
the OLIPPAC legislation indicate another 
problem with such provisions: they weaken 
the separation of powers and require judges 
to adjudicate the internal rules of political 
parties6 or to uphold the rules of procedures 
of parliament. Historically, the courts 
have been reluctant to assume jurisdiction 
over the internal affairs of parliament and 
have viewed the speaker as the proper 
authority for the internal self-regulation of 
parliament.7
The other key part of PNG’s government-
strengthening package is grace periods, 
which were introduced separately as part 
of the 1975 constitution, and extended in 
1991. After an election, a new government 
has 18 months during which there cannot be 
a no-confidence motion (a provision Somare 
in 2004 unsuccessfully attempted to extend 
to 36 months). If there is a no-confidence 
motion in the last 12 months of the life 
of Papua New Guinea’s five-year terms, 
parliament is dissolved and there is an early 
election. Since MPs always wish to prolong 
their periods in office, there never has been 
a successful no-confidence motion in the 
last year of a PNG parliament’s term. That 
shows one interesting way of maintaining 
the safety valve of no-confidence motions, 
while ensuring that they are not used in a 
frivolous manner or simply to grab hold of 
ministerial portfolios or for ‘fund-raising’.8 
If a no-confidence vote entails a general 
dissolution of parliament and an early 
election, MPs might take this option only if 
they are riding the crest of a wave of popular 
dissatisfaction with the government. In 
normal circumstances, as PNG history 
indicates, they will not want to rock the 
boat if that means going back to face the 
electorate earlier than normal. Elections 
are costly affairs. Between 50 and 75 per 
cent of PNG MPs lose their seat at general 
elections.
The consequences of laws that ensure 
that a no-confidence vote entails a general 
dissolution of parliament are illustrated 
by the Kiribati semi-presidential system. 
In Kiribati, the Beretitenti (president) 
is directly elected, but he/she forms a 
cabinet comprising members of parliament. 
Parliament can remove the Beretitenti 
through a confidence vote, but if they do 
so at any point during the president’s term 
of office, all members of the Maneaba ni 
Maungatabu (parliament) lose their seat. A 
president facing a challenge to legislation 
that he is pressing through parliament can 
also stamp this as raising a question of 
confidence, so that if he loses the consequent 
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vote the result is, likewise, a dissolution of 
parliament and a fresh general election.9 
This institutional set-up is a strong deterrent 
to the use of no-confidence motions, but it 
is not watertight. On three occasions—in 
1982, 1993 and 2003—there were premature 
dissolutions of parliament and early 
elections. Nevertheless, there has been 
considerably greater political stability in 
Kiribati than in neighbouring Nauru or 
Tuvalu, where it is possible to dislodge a 
government without going back to the polls. 
Without the dissolution provisions in the 
Kiribati Constitution, there is little doubt that 
the country would have witnessed far more 
regular changes in government.
The impact of the OLIPPAC
What has been the impact of the OLIPPAC 
in Papua New Guinea? First, the number 
of political parties has risen, not fallen;10 it 
has followed a wave-like motion. After the 
OLIPPAC, the number of registered parties 
rose to 43 in 2002, then fell back as a result 
of five amalgamations and de-registration of 
fourteen on-paper parties with no seats at 
all in 2006 and then rose again to 34 ahead 
of the 2007 polls. (Paul Bengo, Registrar of 
Political Parties, cite in ‘Strict terms set for 
new political parties’, The National 4 October 
2006; see also ‘fourteen Political parties 
removed from registry,’ The National, 25 
August 2006. Though different sources cited 
different numbers, the wave-like trend both 
in registered and parliamentary parties is 
clear.) The number of parliamentary parties 
after the 2002 elections was 22. The number 
fell to around 15 in 2006, largely due to 
amalgamations, but then rose to 21 after the 
2007 election (Sepoe et al. 2007). Second, no 
MP has as yet lost his or her seat due to this 
law, although there have been many breaches 
of the OLIPPAC. Cases were referred to the 
ombudsman, but no action was taken.11 
The MPs concerned were all able to retain 
their seats, despite the legal position. In 
that respect, the law was a paper tiger. If 
Somare’s government had been about to fall, 
however, the pressures to enforce the law 
would no doubt have been much greater. 
Third, Somare’s 2002–07 government was 
the first since independence to survive a full 
term in office. In that sense, the law brought 
‘stability’—an achievement much cherished 
by PNG reformers. Although the prime 
minister did not change through 2002–07, 
many of the key ministers changed and there 
were frequent associated changes at the top 
levels of the public sector. No-confidence 
challenges were avoided during Somare’s 
2002–07 government, not only due to the 
18-month grace period and the OLIPPAC 
but by suspension of parliament at critical 
junctures when opposition forces were 
mustering for a challenge, by changes of 
ministers and by the drawing of opposition 
parties into the governing coalition (Sepoe 
et al. 2007:7–8).
There are always dangers associated 
with laws aimed at restricting no-
confidence challenges or at binding MPs 
to political parties. They can stabilise 
popular governments, avoid frivolous no-
confidence motions and permit parliament 
to concentrate on law making; however, 
they can also remove the ability to dislodge 
a corrupt administration or can entrench an 
unpopular government. In Solomon Islands 
on 18 April 2006, Snyder Rini was elected 
prime minister by parliament, behind closed 
doors, after an intense period of wheeling 
and dealing between rival factions based 
at three Chinese-owned Honiara hotels. 
Consequent protests outside parliament 
culminated in the burning down of much of 
Honiara’s Chinatown district and involved 
attacks on Regional Assistance Mission 
to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) vehicles. 
Eight days later, Rini resigned to head off 
an impending no-confidence vote, leading 
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to jubilation among crowds in Honiara. 
If the PNG grace-period legislation had 
been in place in Solomon Islands on 18 
April, the short-lived Rini-led government 
would have had 18 months before it could 
have faced a no-confidence challenge, 
and the OLIPPAC might have given that 
government a full four-year term. With the 
people deprived of constitutional means of 
dislodging the government, social unrest 
might have continued to assume a violent 
and destructive form.12 Locking in such a 
government would have been an unwise 
and dangerous policy choice.
The subsequent government, led by 
Manasseh Sogavare, was keen on making 
a provision to strengthen governments and 
diminish the opportunity for no-confidence 
votes. In the period before the fall of the 
Rini-led government, Sogavare had proved 
able to manoeuvre in such a way as to 
become the opposition’s candidate for the 
prime ministerial post (Fraenkel 2006a). In 
the months after Sogavare captured the top 
job, several frustrated leaders of the smaller 
parties in his Grand Coalition for Change 
broke away and joined the opposition.13 
Ironically, some, such as Bartholomew 
Ulufa’alu and Billy Hilly, had, before the 
April polls, been enthusiasts for laws 
aimed at tying parliamentarians firmly to 
political parties. Had they been successful, 
they would have rendered illegal their own 
subsequent action. Under Sogavare, steps 
were taken to consolidate the position of 
cabinet. Most importantly, the number 
of cabinet ministers was increased from 
20 to 24—close to half the 50-member 
parliament. Together with judicious use of 
chairmanships of state-owned corporations, 
such tactics were aimed at diminishing 
the potential for an opposition challenge. 
In other words, years of effort aimed at 
strengthening the role of parliament were 
potentially under threat. Instead, parliament 
would have reverted to being a mere 
talking shop or rubber-stamping device for 
government.
Plans for the top-down construction 
of a party-based system are unlikely to 
be successful. Parties spontaneously arise 
when there are cleavages in the society that 
generate political polarisation. In the Pacific 
islands, for example, the only three territories 
that have fairly robust political parties are 
all polarised around key issues that divide 
the electorate and politicians. In Fiji, the 
schism between the indigenous Fijian and 
Indo-Fijian migrant-descended politicians 
has been the critical influence on the party 
divide. In New Caledonia and French 
Polynesia, the cleavage has been between 
those parties that want independence and 
those that do not (or those that prefer some 
kind of loose autonomy from France). 
Elsewhere in the region, political parties 
tend chiefly to be loose factional alliances 
that assume significance only in the wake 
of general elections when the issue becomes 
who will form the government.
Even in Samoa, Vanuatu, Marshall 
Islands and Kiribati, where political parties 
are sometimes thought more significant, 
organisations are more fluid than is 
commonly recognised (Fraenkel 2006b). 
Samoa’s dominant Human Rights Protection 
Party might be unique in the Pacific because 
it has ruled, with only one brief exception, 
for one-quarter of a century. In the wake of 
elections, however, Samoan MPs, like those 
elsewhere in the region, seek to gravitate 
towards the government benches, and 
political allegiances can be fluid. Vanuatu 
once had a robust party system focused 
on the anglophone/francophone cleavage 
during the days of Walter Lini’s Vanua’aku 
Pati and the opposition Union of Moderate 
Parties, but, after 1991, the major parties 
increasingly splintered and a more fractured 
political environment emerged (Van Trease 
2005)—although some micro-parties are still 
more organisationally robust in Vanuatu than 
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in other Melanesian countries. Where parties 
have arisen spontaneously because there are 
key issues that divide people, this no doubt 
adds to the coherence of parliamentary 
processes; it also raises other difficulties, 
as the troubles of Fiji, New Caledonia and 
French Polynesia clearly show.
Party strengthening laws in 
Solomon Islands
In and of themselves, OLIPPAC-type policies 
will not promote a coherent party system 
in Solomon Islands. They will, however, 
strengthen the élite and make more difficult 
the emergence of political newcomers, and 
perhaps contribute to frustrations about 
unaccountable leadership. At present, the 
so-called political parties in Solomon Islands 
are primarily vehicles for securing the top 
job for ambitious political big-men and their 
supporters. For example, immediately after 
the 2006 polls, Chinese businessman Tommy 
Chan published a full-page advertisement in 
the Solomon Star listing alleged members of 
the Association of Independent Members of 
Parliament (AIMP) in a bid to win support 
for his favoured candidate, Snyder Rini 
(Solomon Star, 10 April 2006). Many of the 
MPs listed in that advertisement had no idea 
that they were being cast as ‘members’ of the 
AIMP, or the MP for this or that constituency 
was listed without a name (presumably 
because the writers did not know the 
electoral outcome in that constituency when 
they submitted the advertisement).
The example indicates something 
about what political parties (or, in this case, 
clusters of independent members) are in 
Solomon Islands. Similarly, former Prime 
Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu published 
advertisements in the newspapers giving 
photos of the alleged candidates for his 
Liberal Party shortly before the 2006 polls, 
also hoping thereby to strengthen his claim 
to political leadership. In response, several 
candidates wrote angry letters to the 
newspapers denying any connections with 
the Liberal Party (‘Liberals vie for 38 seats’, 
Solomon Star, 28 February 2006; ‘Former 
MPs refute Liberal’s claim’, Solomon Star, 28 
February 2006). In their quest for the prime 
ministerial position after general elections, 
the big-men of Solomon Islands politics 
seek to project an image of significant 
support, hoping to generate a roller-coaster 
or bandwagon-type effect so that others 
quickly jump aboard, fearing exclusion from 
the impending process of distribution of 
ministerial portfolios.
If Solomon Islands introduces Papua 
New Guinea-style legislation tying new 
members more firmly to these political big-
men, the result will be to make competition 
during the period between general elections 
and the prime ministerial vote even more 
intense than at present—and even more 
susceptible to money politics. Asian loggers 
and would-be casino operators will be more 
likely to seek to influence this process. The 
stakes will be raised because lobbyists will 
know that, once the government is elected, 
it could be locked in for a full four-year 
term. Competition between the camps 
habitually established at Honiara’s hotels 
will consequently be even more vigorous 
than usual, undermining the popular 
objective of seeking to avoid corruption 
surrounding the so-called ‘second election’. 
Only during this brief period will the 
bargaining power and opportunism of the 
new, first-time MPs be greatly strengthened. 
Once the government is formed, the 
well-established politicians who receive 
ministerial portfolios will be better able to 
consolidate their control over parliament. 
Female politicians, of whom a growing 
number have been contesting elections 
of late, will be weakened and alternative 
newer groupings will find themselves at 
a great disadvantage compared with the 
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established so-called parties. Eventually, the 
likely result will be a major political crisis, 
unless wise counsel prevails among judges 
who themselves ditch the new legislation.
Other approaches to 
strengthening governments in 
Solomon Islands
Reforming Westminster systems to 
remove the possibility of no-confidence 
votes is the worst possible way to reform 
Solomon Islands institutions or strengthen 
government. The primary advantage of 
Westminster systems is that they generate 
greater potential for the mid-term removal 
of unpopular governments than presidential 
systems. In presidential systems, it is usually 
difficult to remove the head of state and the 
government unless opponents go through 
long and elaborate methods of impeachment. 
As a result, presidential systems—as in much 
of Latin America—have often been said to 
be more prone to coups than parliamentary 
systems (see Linz and Valenzuela 1994; 
Shugart and Mainwaring 1997). On the 
other hand, the advantage of presidential 
systems is that they entail nation-wide direct 
elections for the head of government, with 
the result that the government has a strong 
and direct popular mandate. Retaining 
the parliamentary system—without the 
associated possibility of mid-term removal 
of governments—means adopting the 
weaker aspects of both systems. It misses 
out on the direct popular vote for the head 
of state, but adopts only the inflexibility of 
the locked-in form of government.
A standard presidential system would, 
however, also be a poor choice for the 
Solomon Islands. Presidential systems tend 
to be highly majoritarian; there is a single 
presidential position to fill and the most 
populous group (if it votes for a single 
candidate) will usually be able to capture 
the presidency. Another advantage of the 
parliamentary system in Solomon Islands 
is that governments have usually had to be 
coalitions with representatives from across 
the group, balancing, in particular, leaders 
from Malaita, Guadalcanal and the Western 
Province.
For the Solomon Islands, the better option 
would be to retain the prime ministerial 
system but introduce legislation that 
makes a successful no-confidence motion 
entail a general dissolution of parliament. 
Political scientists who are unfamiliar with 
Pacific politics might warn that this will 
entail too many snap elections and short-
lived governments. Another consequence, 
however, of the weakness of parties in 
Melanesia is an extreme reluctance on the 
part of politicians to consider a premature 
dissolution. As we saw previously, Papua 
New Guinea has never had a successful 
no-confidence motion during the last 12 
months of a government, when doing so 
would entail a parliamentary dissolution. 
Kiribati has had three dissolutions, but 
has nevertheless been more politically 
stable than its closest neighbours. Making 
a no-confidence vote entail a dissolution 
of parliament is a far better option than 
forbidding no-confidence votes for certain 
grace periods or locking MPs into backing 
this or that political leader.
Neither option would, however, in 
itself, do anything to diminish political 
horse-trading between the general election 
and the prime ministerial election. There 
are four viable responses to address these 
issues. First, the prime ministerial election 
might be opened to public scrutiny, rather 
than taking place by secret ballot.14 In 2006, 
election observers declined to observe the 
so-called ‘second election’ on the grounds 
that the constitution forbid them doing so. 
Second, the period between the general 
election and the prime ministerial election 
could be shortened (the 13 days separating 
162
Pacific Economic BullEtin
Policy dialogue
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 23 number 3 2008 © the australian national university
the two in 2006 compounded difficulties 
and increased the scope for corruption). 
Third, politicians might be subjected to more 
rigorous scrutiny by formalising the anti-
corruption ‘pledges’ signed by candidates 
on the 2006 campaign trail.  Nomination 
forms signed by intending candidates before 
a general election, might subject would-be 
MPs to greater scrutiny by a strengthened 
Leadership Code Commission. Ultimately, 
however, tackling corruption during the 
run-up to a prime ministerial election is 
not something that will be achieved by new 
legislation. Laws against corruption already 
exist on the statute books. Curtailing these 
kinds of activities would be greatly assisted 
by only one or two high-profile convictions 
of would-be lobbyists offering cash in the 
run up to a prime ministerial election.
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Notes
1 This is an extended version of a talk given 
at Land, Politics and Development in 
Melanesia, a seminar organised by The 
Australian National University, the Solomon 
Islands government and the Solomon Islands 
College of Higher Education, 29 July 2008. I 
am indebted to Anthony Regan and David 
Hegarty for their comments on an earlier 
version of the paper.
2 ‘If at anytime it appears to the Governor-
General, acting in accordance with the advice of 
the Speaker, that the leader of an independent 
group, by reason of the numerical strength of 
that independent group or by reason of the 
support which he receives from the members 
of independent groups generally, should 
be appointed as Leader of the Independent 
Members, the Governor-General shall appoint 
him as such [a] leader’ (The Solomon Islands 
Independence Order 1978, s.66[2]). To drop this 
provision seems sensible. 
3 The Organic Law on the Integrity of Political 
Parties and Candidates 2003. Available from 
http://www.paclii.org/pg/legis/consol_
act/olotioppac2003542
4 For a discussion of the different meanings 
of the word ‘integrity’ used in Papua New 
Guinea, see Baker (2005).
5 See Vohor vs Attorney General [2004], Civil 
Appeal Case 24 of 2004, 8 December 2004. 
See also ‘Vanuatu agrees to constitutional 
reform’, Vanuatu Daily Post, 19 October 2004; 
‘Court to decide legality of 12-month grace 
period’, Vanuatu Daily Post, 5 December 2004; 
Jowitt 2005:462. 
9 This issue arose also regarding the Fijian 
legislation, when the courts found it 
impossible to establish which of the two 
New Labour Unity Party MPs had ‘crossed 
the floor’ since there was no internal party 
resolution making clear the stance of the 
party (see Fraenkel 2004:128–9).
7 ‘The whole of the law and custom of 
parliament has its [origin in] this one maxim, 
that whatever matter arises concerning 
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examined, discussed, and adjudged in 
that House to which it relates, and not 
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were introduced, from 42 in 2001 to 15 in 
2005’ (Reilly 2006:191). He neglects that 
the initial reaction was a rise just before 
the 2002 polls, and confuses the number of 
registered parties (that is, nominal parties 
on the books of the Office of the Registrar 
of Political Parties) with the number of 
parliamentary parties (that is, parties with 
seats in parliament). A significant proportion 
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the number of parliamentary parties after the 
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11 In some cases, this was because internal party 
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vote.
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in office (and therefore when there could not 
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mercenaries with the objective of violently 
ending the Bougainville conflict. Mass public 
demonstrations and a military revolt, rather 
than a parliamentary reaction, put an end to 
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familiar tactic in Papua New Guinea—under 
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in Somare’s National Alliance in 2004 boasted 
that ‘we have cut off the heads of the minor 
parties and will be able to gather up the 
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under the preceding sub-paragraph shall be 
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